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EDITOR.
A HALF CENTURY OF THE JUVENILE COURT
In 1899 the Illinois legislature provided for the world's first Juvenile
Court. By the middle of the Twentieth Century every state but one had
passed some type of Juvenile Court Statute. From the beginning the
movement was influenced by the Juvenile Court Philosophy, an ideology
promulgated chiefly by child welfare workers, criminologists, and a small
core of judges in various academic, legal and popular journals. It
became so well known that many statutes provided for a "Juvenile
Court" without defining its aims and procedures. Others explicitly
adopted the philosophy's aim without stating how to carry it out, except
that some said simply that equity procedures were to be used. These
circumstances created difficult problems of statutory interpretation.
To complicate matters, a conflict arose in the legal profession as to
whether or not the procedures of the Juvenile Court Philosophy violate
the child offender's constitutional rights. Because of this conflict, and
the limited facilities of most juvenile courts, the philosophy has been
only partially effectuated. How much? An answer to this question is
important if, as many criminologists believe, the Juvenile Court is the
experimental proving ground for changes in the entire crime control
system. The report published here provides a partial answer to this
difficult question.
THE PROBLEM
The literature of the juvenile court is replete with statements that
the assumptions, terminology and procedures of the criminal court are
obstacles to the aim of rehabilitation in the juvenile court.' A major
reason why, allegedly, is that the typical juvenile court judge has had
criminal law training and experience, and that this strongly influences
the way he plays the role of juvenile court judge. Empirical support
1. For examples of this see the following: PAULINE V. YOUNG, Social Treatment in
Probation and Delinquency, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937, p. 194.
WALTER A. LUNDEN, Systematic Source Book in Juvenile Delinquency, Pittsburgh, Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh, 1938, p. 201. MIRIAM VAN WATERS, The Socialization of Juvenile
Court Procedure, J. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOL. 13:69, May, 1922. F. H. ALLEN,
"Mental Attitudes in a Ju'venile Court," NATIONAL PROBATION ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK, 1929,
p. 137. FRPEDEICK A. MORAN, New Light on the Juvenile Courts and Probation, NATIONAL
PROBATION AssOcIATION YEARBOOK, 1930, p. 69.
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for this proposition apparently has been found in research by the
Gluecks, 2 Alper,3 Tappan,4 and the National Probation Association. 5
None of these investigators was centrally concerned with the detailed
content of the juvenile court judge's role-definition; but, in studying
various phases of the court's functioning, they all observed a marked
degree of the criminal court approach in the behavior of juvenile court
judges.
The general purpose of the present study was to investigate the nature
of the role-definitions of juvenile court judges in the State of Iowa. The
statements and empirical findings referred to above made it seem reason-
able to establish the following as the major hypothesis of the study.
Major Hypothesis
The Iowa Juvenile Court Judge's conception of his role approximates
more nearly the role of the criminal court judge than the role defined
by the juvenile court philosophy.6
After the major hypothesis had been precisely stated, research opera-
tions were designed to test it as carefully as possible with available
resources. The entire study was guided by this hypothesis and the
following two sub-hypotheses.
1.: To the degree that the Iowa Juvenile Court Judge's conception
of his role deviates from the criminal court role, it is defined by primary
group controls rather than by the juvenile court philosophy.
2. SHELDON S. GLTUEcK AND ELEANOR T. GLUECK, One Thousand Juvenile Delin-
quents, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1934. On p. 28 the authors state that
judges, although functioning under the same legislation, vary markedly in their attitudes
towards their work with delinquents. On pp. 24548 they note that the judge's attitude
towards his work is often ambivalent because he is supposed to be sympathetic towards
the individual delinquent and at the same time safeguard the general security.
3. BwairEicT S. ALPER, Juvenile Justice: A Study of Juvenile Appeals to the Suffolk
Superior Court, Boston, 1930-37, J. CRiM. LAW AND CRIMINOL. 28:343-67, September, 1937.
Alper found that appeals from the juvenile court undermined the rehabilitative aim be-
cause the appellate court used criminal procedure and treated each appeal as de novo."
4. PAUL W. TAPPAN, Delinquent Girls in Court: A Study of the Wrayward Minor
Court of New York, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947. On p. 89 Tappan says
that judges in the Wayward Minor Court have retributive attitudes due to the fact
that they also serve in the Women's Court. On pp. 168-69 he states that judges vary widely
in disposition tendencies, which causes extenuating circumstances and the availability of
facilities to play too large a part.
5. NATIONAL PROBATION AsSOcIATION, Juvenile Courts and Probation in Iowa. Report
of a State Wide Survey, May, 1930, pp. 5-29. This survey found that criminal court
procedures were thwarting the aim of rehabilitation in many of Iowa's juvenile courts,
especially the most rural ones.
6. This seemed an especially plausible hypothesis for Iowa judges because: (1) The
Iowa judge spends relatively little time playing the role of juvenile court judge compared
to the time spent playing the roles of civil and criminal court judge, (2) The Iowa judge
receives formal training in criminal law procedure but not in juvenile court philosophy and
procedure, (3) Iowa is a relatively rural state and it appears that in rural areas the need
for the juvenile court is not strongly felt, and (4) Such services as probation, medical,
psychiatric and psychological examinations are- generally inadequate and this tends to
restrict the rehabilitative functions of Iowa's juvenile courts.
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This follows the broader sociological hypothesis, advanced notably
by W. I. Thomas 7 and L. L. Bernard," that primary group controls
tend to be transferred to secondary situations-where they are ineffec-
tive.9 There is an important difference between such primary group
controls as praise and blame, shaming, etc., and the equity-like methods
outlined in the juvenile court philosophy.10 The Iowa Juvenile Court
Judge operates under broad and ill-defined statutory powers.'1 Some of
the few cases which have been decided under the statute distinguish be-
tween delinquency and crime and embrace the aim of rehabilitation, but
they offer little help as to what specific procedures should be followed.'
2
Since he has few rehabilitative facilities, it would seem that the judge's
role-definition might well be in terms of primary group controls.
2.: There is a direct relationship between the population size of-
(1) the area of the court's jurisdiction, (2) the city or town in which
the judge resides, and (3) the city or town in which the judge grew up,
and the degree to which the judge's conception of his role approximates
that of the juvenile court philosophy.
The logic of this hypothesis is that appreciation of the procedures
outlined in the juvenile court philosophy is directly related to urbaniza-
tion. The proportion of secondary contacts increases with urbanization.
Thus, the procedures of the juvenile court philosophy being secondary
in character, an association may be expected between their acceptance
and measures of urbanization which are meaningful in the judge's
experience.
METHODS
The approach to role-definition adopted for the study was the eliciting
of verbal expressions about the juvenile court from Iowa judges. Some
7. HERBERT S. JENNINGS, JOHN B. WATSON, ADOLPH MEYER, WM. I. THOMAS, Suggestions
of Modern Science Concerning Education, WILLIAM I. THOMAS: The Persistence of
Primary Group Norms in Present-Day Society and Their Influence in Our Educational
System, pp. 159-97, New York. The Macmillan Company, 1917.
8. LUTHER L. BERNARD, The Conflict Between Primary Group Attitudes and Derivative
Group Ideals in Modern Society, AM. J. SOCIOL., 41:621-23, March, 1936.
9. HARRY ELMER BARNES, Social Institutions, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946,
pp. 665-66. PAuL H. LANDIS, Social Control: Social Organization and Disorganization in
Process, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939, pp. 465-66. Barnes and Landis
have characterized juvenile court procedure as a secondary group approach to social control.
10. RoscoE POUND, The Future of Socialized Justice, YEARBOOK NATIONAL PROBATION
ASSOCIATION, 1946, pp. 6-18. Pound states that individualization does not mean throwing
method overboard but the use of different methods-those of the court of equity.
11. IOwA CODE, chapters 231 (Juvenile Court), 232 (Care of Neglected, Dependant, and
Delinquent Children), and 233 (Contributing to Juqenile Delinquency) (1946). These three
chapters are here considered in combination to be Iowa's juvenile court statute.
12. The Iowa statute was declared constitutional in the case of Wissenburg v. Bradley,
209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205, 67 A. L. R. 1075 (1930). Other relevant cases are: State v.
Reed, 207 Iowa 557 (1929); State v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 300, 194 N.W. 202 (1923); King
v. Sears, 177 Iowa 163, 158 N.W. 513 (1916); and Ferguson v. Pottawattamie Co., 224-
Iowa 516, 278 N.W. 223 (1938).
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questions dealt directly and some indirectly13 with the functions of the
judge in various court situations, and it seemed apparent that such
questions would elicit attitudes bearing upon role-definition. It need not
be assumed that verbal answers to such questions make it possible to
predict with perfect accuracy the way the judge actually plays the role,
but reliably measured attitudes may nevertheless secure significant in-
formation and provide short-cuts to prediction and control. 14" 51
To elicit the judge's attitudes both questionnaires and interviews
were employed. The questionnaire consisted mainly of situational ques-
tions, and a variety of question forms was used in the attempt to prevent
questions from suggesting particular responses.
After several revisions it was felt that the questionnaire needed
further improvement and a formal pre-testing procedure was decided
upon. Eight practicing lawyers, all greatly interested, and seven of
whom had had considerable experience with juvenile cases, were the
pre-test subjects. After they had filled out the questionnaire five of
them were interviewed. The reliability and validity of the questionnaire
were not tested in a precise way, but the logic of the tests was employed
for the purpose of improving the questionnaire.' 6 Several questions
were changed and some omitted as a result of these checks, and other
revisions made in accordance with the lawyers' suggestions. Although
the pre-test required much time and effort, it is believed that it improved
the questionnaire considerably.
Before the final form of the questionnaire was mailed to the judges,
criteria for classifying responses to questions pertaining to the major
hypothesis and the "Primary Group" sub-hypothesis were listed. In
formulating the criteria for the major hypothesis questions, the general
typology of rehabilitation versus punishment for specific acts was fol-
lowed.' 7 Ideal-type "Juvenile Court" and "Criminal Court" responses
were stated for each open-end question and decisions made as to classi-
fying check-list questions. The intermediate category of "Non-Juvenile
13. A question as to whether rules of evidence should be used, for example, indirectly
gets at the judge's conception of his functions in the court hearing.
14. GEORGE LUNDBERG, Social Research, 2nd ed., New York, Longmans, Green and
Company, 1942, pp. 214-20.
15. JOHN W. BENNETT AND MELVIN M. TUMIN, social Life, New York, Alfred A. Knopf,
1948, p. 328.
16. The validity of each question was checked by comparing questionnaire responses
and interview statements. The test of internal consistency was used to check the reliability
of questionnaire items.
17. See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, Principles of Criminology, 4th ed., Philadelphia, J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1947, pp. 304-5; HERBERT H. LOU, Juvenile Courts in the United
States, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1927, p. 36; and GEORGE HERBERT
MEAD, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, AM. J. SocIOL., 23:577-602, March, 1918. Crim-
inal and juvenile courts may in practice vary from the ideal-types, of course. This study
was based on hypotheses as to the variance of the juvenile court from the ideal-type.
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Court" was utilized in the list of criteria because no possible response
to some of the items could be construed as evidence of a definite
"Criminal Court" attitude. When the returned questionnaires were
being read, several unanticipated responses appeared, necessitating addi-
tions to the list of criteria.
In the letter of explanation which accompanied the questionnaire the
judges were guaranteed anonymity. Forty of Iowa's 73 juvenile court
judges:" filled out and returned questionnaires without additional urg-
ing; 14 more returned them after a follow-up letter was sent; and two
returned them after they had been interviewed. This makes a total of
56 returned questionnaires, a 76.7 percent return.'
After each questionnaire had been read and the responses recorded
on a work sheet, the percentage of classifiable responses to major hypo-
thesis questions which had been classified as "Juvenile Court" was cal-
culated. These percentage scores, hereafter called "questionnaire
scores," thus indicate the degree of the juvenile court philosophy in the
judge's role-definition.
Many responses could not be classified and no attempt was made to
force answers into categories where they did not reasonably belong.
Most of the judges had at least one non-classifiable response, and a few
had several. Most answers were classifiable, however, and many fitted
the ideal-type responses quite well. A Chi square test found no associa-
tion at the .05 or .10 levels of significance between the questionnaire
scores and the number per judge of non-classifiable responses to major
hypothesis questions. Thus, the probability is high that the non-classi-
fiable responses did not introduce a serious bias.19
If the probable and standard errors mentioned appear too low, it
must be noted that a correction was used which applies whenever a
sample is taken from a finite universe. This study deals not with an
infinite universe, but with the 73 Iowa judges who have juvenile court
jurisdiction. All standard errors in the study were thus multiplied by a
constant (.483) which was obtained by using the formula:
VP-NV P
18. Of these, 65 are district court judges; seven are municipal court judges; and one
is a superior court judge.
19. Following the tabulation of the questionnaire responses the reliability of the major
hypothesis questions was tested by the Chance Halves method. The Pearsonian coefficient
of correlation (r) between these chance haves is .57 =!_ .03. The deviant judge whose
questionnaire score on both halves was zero was a big factor in causing this r to be so
large, so his questionnaire was omitted and an r of .43 "- .04 obtained. The Chance
Halves test can yield spuriously high reliability coefficients, but the more conservative r
(.43) is 8.6 times greater than the S. E. (.05).
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where P equals the number of units in the universe and N equals the
number of units in the sample.20
The interviews were designed mainly to help interpret the question-
naire findings, but also to provide a check on the validity of the major
hypothesis items in the questionnaire. The open-end interview was used.
No notes were taken, but a complete account of all that could be remem-
bered was typed as soon afterwards as possible. The interview reports
were later read and information recorded on a work sheet.
The interview sample was selected for representativeness as to
several factors. 21 Some substituting was necessary, but eventually 30
judges were interviewed. The sample selected included eight non-
respondents, but only four of them were ever interviewed. Their atti-
tudes did not seem to differ significantly from those of respondents.
22
In order to compare questionnaire and interview findings in regard
to the major hypothesis, each interview report was rated by the use of
the following categories:
I. Marked "Juvenile Court" attitude with relatively little evidence of the"Criminal Court" attitude.
II. Predominantly a "Juvenile Court" attitude with considerable evidence of the
"Criminal Court" attitude.
III. Predominantly a "Criminal Court" attitude with considerable evidence of the
"Juvenile Court" attitude.
IV. Marked "Criminal Court" attitude with relatively little evidence of the
"Juvenile Court" attitude.
These were designed for comparison with the fourths of the possible
percentage distribution of questionnaire scores.28  They were not in-
tended to be equal intervals on a scale; in fact categories I. and IV. are
probably close to the end-points while II. and III. are probably near the
mid-point. But category I. may be thought of as between 75 and 100
percent; II. between 50 and 75 percent, etc.
The investigator's interview ratings were then checked against those
20. MARGARET JARMAN HAGOOD, Statistics for Sociologists, New York, Reynal and Hitch-
cock, Inc., 1941, p. 422.
21. The sample was selected to be representative as to: (1) The distribution of ques-
tionnaire scores, (2) The number of judges with juvenile court jurisdiction in each section
of the state, (3) The number of questionnaire respondents in each section of the state, and
(4) The percentage of urbanization in the judicial district. Other factors were also con-
sidered. The group eventually interviewed was best balanced from the standpoint of the
distribution of questionnaire scores, six being in the upper fourth of the distribution, seven
in the second, seven in the third, and six in the lower fourth.
22. Two expressed marked "Juvenile Court" attitudes; one was ambivalent; and one
voiced a moderately punitive approach.
23. This must be distinguished from the fourths of the actual distribution of question-
naire scores. For example, the score of 62.5 falls in the lower fourth of the distribution




of a panel of five neutral persons. 24 There was a fairly high degree of
agreement among the panel members, and in general their ratings
agreed with the investigator's. Although not conclusive, this corrobo-
ration appeared convincing enough to warrant a statistical test of the
association between questionnaire scores and the investigator's interview
report ratings. A Chi square test demonstrated an association at the
.001 level of significance.
25
QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS
The range of questionnaire scores is from zero to 93.8, showing that
the judges' role-definitions vary widely. Even when the very deviant
score of zero26 is omitted the range is wide-from 41.7 to 93.8.
Following is the range of scores by fourths of the questionnaire score
distribution:
Fourth of Questionnaire Range of Questionnaire
Score Distribution Scores
1........................ 87.5 to 93.8
I ........................ 76.5 to 86.7
I ........................ 69.2 to 75.0
IV ........................ 0.0 to 68.8
Only three of the scores fall below 50, which means that only three of
the 56 judges made a majority of "Criminal Court" responses. The
mean of the distribution, excluding the zero score, is 76.3 ± 2.42 (S. E.
of the mean is 3.6.) The median score is 75.8.
On the basis of this data the major hypothesis must be rejected. The
"Criminal Court" conception is present in varying degrees in the ap-
proach taken by all the judges, (since no judge has a score of 100) but
predominantly the judges expressed "Juvenile Court" rather than
"Criminal Court" conceptions of their juvenile court role.2 The dis-
24. Four of these were members of the Department of Sociology at the University of
Iowa and one was a law student. First the panel was asked to rate four interview reports
which the investigator had chosen as typical of the four rating categories. This resulted
in complete agreement by four of the panel members, but the fifth transposed the reports
selected as typical of categories II. and III. Next a random sample of six reports was
selected by taking every fifth one of the 30, and the panel was asked to rate them. The
majority judgment of the panel differed from the investigator's rating in only one instance,
and all defined this as a "borderline" case.
25. This comparison was based on 24 judges. Two interview reports were non-
classifiable, and four of the 30 interviewees were non-respondents. Since the interviews
were not designed to provide a careful validity check on the questionnaire this correspond-
ence is surprising, although all the interviewees did volunteer 'and elaborate on pertinent
matters. This finding seems to indicate a good probability that the major hypothesis
questionnaire items are valid measures.
26. Because this score was so deviant it was omitted from all calculations which might
have been unduly biased by it.
27. Additional weight is lent the rejection of the major hypothesis by the fact that during
the analysis evidence appeared which suggested that certain responses classed as "Criminal
[Vol. 42
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cussion below of the responses to several of the major hypothesis ques-
tions will lend meaning to the above data.
Only two of the 17 questions received more "Criminal Court" than
"Juvenile Court" responses. To the question as to whether juvenile
offenders should have the right to be represented by an attorney the
judges answered "Yes" unanimously. Most of the explanatory remarks
were explicitly or implicitly in terms of protecting the child's constitu-
tional rights, except for a number of such-statements as: "It helps make
a better disposition of the case." 28 The item receiving the second high-
est percentage (76 percent) of "Criminal Court" answers is a check-list
question asking what persons should be allowed to attend juvenile court
hearings. 29 Thirty-two of the 56 respondents checked "arresting offi-
cers"; 38 checked "witnesses to the offense"; and one checked "the gen-
eral public." 30 If any one or more of these was checked, the response
was classed as "Definite Criminal Court."
Only one question obtained a unanimous "Juvenile Court" resporise-
the one which asked whether or not it is desirable that the Iowa Juvenile
Court is a court of equity. The most frequent reasons given for the
"Yes" answer were that equity procedures facilitate informality, indi-
vidualization and rehabilitation. 3 Fifty said "No" to the proposition
that there should be uniform rules for treating all juvenile offenders who
commit the same offense, the typical explanation being that children
have varied temperaments and backgrounds and thus that treatment
Court" do not necessarily indicate that attitude. For example, testing indicated that the
"Non-Juvenile Court" responses should not be construed as "Definite Criminal Court"
attitudes. Only 22 of the 56 made "Non-Juvenile Court" responses, but this number seemed
to warrant careful testing for a possible bias. A Chi square test found "Non-Juvenile
Court" and "Definite Criminal Court" responses not significantly associated-not even at
the .30 level. Thus, "Non-Juvenile Court" responses represent a middle ground, and any
judge who made many such responses might have a spuriously low questionnaire score
since these were counted as "Criminal Court" responses (of low intensity).
28. Such explanations as the latter might make it seem that the "Yes" answer prob-
ably should not have been tabulated automatically as a "Criminal Court" response. How-
ever, according to the Juvenile Court Philosophy, the mere presence of an attorney creates
the atmosphere of the criminal trial.
29. Chi square testing found responses to this question to be associated with the ques-
tionnaire scores at the .001 level of significance. Only one other question was so associated
at the .001 level-a general open-end question asking what sort of procedure should be
followed in the juvenile court hearing, to which 84 percent replied that informal pro-
cedure is desirable to secure the child's confidence. These appear to be the two best ques-
tions, if the validity of the questionaire as a whole is assumed. Two questions were
associated with questionnaire scores at the .01 level. One asked whether the probation
officer's report should be oral or written, and 77 percent indicated the latter. The other
asked where the hearing should be held; 14 checked "the regular courtroom," while 32
checked "the judge's chambers" or a "special juvenile courtroom."
go. Other items in the check-list were: the offender's parents, the probation officer,
relatives other than parents, and the county attorney. The "Juvenile Court" response
consisted of checking either the first or second of these, or both; and the third and fourth
were treated as consistent with the "Juvenile Court" response.
31. Seventeen answers were non-classifiable because neither a "Yes" nor "No" response
was classified if no explanation was given.
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must be varied to fit the individual case. Forty-five out of 50 who gave
classifiable responses said the delinquent should not be required to enter
a plea of "guilty" or "not guilty," the most frequent reason being that
the delinquent is not tried for a crime. For the same reason, in most
cases, 85 percent who gave classifiable answers said delinquents should
not have the right of trial by jury. Forty-one answered that rules of
evidence should not be used in juvenile hearings, chiefly because they
operate against the desired informality of the hearing, some adding that
the competency of evidence is irrelevant when there is no jury. Twelve
said rules of evidence should be used.
Forty-eight out of 51 whose answers were classifiable objected to
newspaper accounts of juvenile court hearings, mainly on the ground
that they stigmatize the child and prevent rehabilitation. In response
to the question, "What sort of detention facilities for juvenile offenders
do you recommend?" None of the judges checked "regular county jail
cells"; eight checked "a separate cell in the county jail"; 42 checked "a
special juvenile detention home" or specified something similar. The
question which asked what use should be made of the probation officer's
pre-hearing report obtained 88 percent "Juvenile Court" responses, the
typical explanation being that it should be carefully studied by the judge
prior to the hearing and also used later in formulating a treatment pro-
gram. In the minds of 81 percent of those who gave classifiable re-
sponses, commitment to a correctional institution is not desirable except
as a last resort.
3 2
The three questions pertaining to the first Sub-Hypothesis asked
whether or not it is part of the judge's duty to conduct himself in a
father-like fashion, give offenders an idea of the "Might of the Law,"
and lecture offenders to impress on them the seriousness of their acts.
"Yes" answers were tabulated as evidence of the "Primary Group"
approach to the role-definition problem. Chi square testing resulted in
the rejection of the ptimary group sub-hypothesis and the conclusion
that primary group attitudes and marked criminal court attitudes are
associated. 33 When the judge's role-definition deviates from the criminal
32. One of the first interviews caused the investigator to think that a judge might
express "Juvenile Court" aims and yet have "Criminal Court" attitudes about methods.
Examination of the questionnaire divulged that only one major hypothesis question dealt
solely with the court's aims. (This question was: "What is the general purpose of the
juvenile court hearing?") This probably resulted from the attempt to make the questions
as "situational" as possible. At any rate, 78 percent of the answers to this question, and
75.2 percent of the answers to the 16 "method" questions were classified as "Juvenile
Court" responses. The difference between these percentages is 2.8 and the S. E. of the
difference is 3.7. The finding that the "aims" and "method" responses did not differ
significantly is very inconclusive since there is only one "aims" question.
33. A Chi square test of the association between the number of "Yes" answers to these
three questions and the questionnaire scores (which pertain only to major hypothesis
-xN 7,-
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court philosophy it tends to approximate the juvenile court philosophy
rather than primary group controls.
Statistical testing of the second Sub-Hypothesis found only one
of the three measures of urbanization-the size of the town in which
the judge resides-to be associated with questionnaire scores at a rea-
sonably safe level of significance. The Pearsonian coefficient of corre-
lation (r) obtained is .14±-- '.03. This r, though small, is significant at
the .01 level.3 4 Possibly the judge's conception of juvenile court pro-
cedure is to a considerable extent based upon what seems appropriate in
the life conditions he sees influencing his own and his neighbor's children.
However, this is not very impressive evidence for the urbanization
hypothesis.
INTERVIEW FINDINGs
It should be kept in mind that most of the interview statements were
volunteered after the interviewer had posed one or two general ques-
tions. This means: (1) that most of the interview statements were not
structured by the interviewer, and (2) that the results should not be
interpreted as though an opinion poll had been taken. (For example,
the fact that six interviewees made a certain statement does not mean
that the other 24 feel differently about the matter.)
The interviews bore out what seemed apparent from the way the
judges had cooperated in returning questionnaires and arranging inter-
view times-that they are strongly interested in the juvenile court.
Many judges said delinquency cases constitute their most difficult re-
sponsibility and that they feel inadequately trained for it.
All the interviewees made statements pertinent to the major hypo-
thesis, and in the discussion of methods it was mentioned that for the
group as a whole these statements did not differ significantly from ques-
tionnaire scores. Some "Criminal Court" attitudes were expressed, but
the juvenile court philosophy predominated. Twenty of the 30 inter-
viewees volunteered statements of the purpose of the court in terms of
rehabilitation; only two stated "Criminal Court" purposes.
Six judges expressed the belief that the juvenile offender should be
represented by an attorney. Three placed this on the "Criminal Court"
questions) found a negative association, significant at approximately the .09 level. Next,
Chi square tests were made of the association between the number of "Yes" answers and
(1) number of "Non-Juvenile Court" responses, and (2) number of "Definite Criminal
Court" responses. The first found a positive association not significant even at the .10
level; but the second-found a positive association significant at the .05 level.
34. The r between the percentage of urbanization in the area of the court's jurisdiction
and questionnaire scores is nearly as large (.14 ±h .04) but is not significant at the .01
level. A Chi square test of association between questionnaire scores and size of the
judge's childhood town found the association not to be significant even at the .30 level.
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ground of constitutional rights; the other three explained that the child's
counsel is not a defense attorney, but that he joins in the working out
of a program of treatment. Sixteen alleged that they rely on the pre-
hearing investigation as the basic source of information,85 while four
said they depend on the hearing. Several mentioned that they commit
only around five percent of all juvenile offenders to correctional insti-
tutions.
Nine called for more adequate probation facilities, saying mainly that
if salaries were adequate there could be more full-time, well-trained
probation officers. Five volunteered that more adequate psychological
and psychiatric services are needed. It was suggested by two judges
that the juvenile court could succeed better if its aims were more gen-
erally appreciated. They criticized journalists, peace officers and county
attorneys for their punitive approach to juvenile offenders. Six judges
would like to see a greater variety of state institutions, especially an
"intermediate" institution for lesser offenders.
All but five of the 30 interviewees explained their theories of delin-
quency causation. Fourteen blamed poor parental supervision, while
several criticized this explanation and suggested such factors as poverty,
demands of the school on the child's time, lack of self-esteem, and the
total set of community influences. Four said they frequently fine or jail
parents under the "contributing to delinquency" provisions,3 6 but a
number of judges strongly denounced the punishment of parents. Only
one, the judge whose questionnaire score was zero, stated that delin-
quency is biologically caused.
37
Belief in some form of primary group control was volunteered by 12
judges. Several spoke of ways of "getting under their skin," of impres-
sing offenders with the might of the law and the seriousness of their
wrongdoing, while two objected strongly to "this preaching." One de-
scribed a "you-have-let-your-friends-down" technique, and another the
father approach. Some who spoke of these primary group techniques
seemed to believe that they make such an impact on the child during the
hearing that little else is needed for rehabilitation.
CONCLUSIONS
The role-definitions of Iowa's juvenile court judges-all functioning
under the same statute-vary widely. Despite the range of attitudes,
35. In several courts without probation officers, pre-hearing investigations are made by
child welfare workers or county attorneys.
36. IOWA CODE, Chapter 233 (1946).
37. He said the criminal court and juvenile court judges have the same problem-the
separation of offenders into classes, the criminals and the non-criminals.
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however, the data clearly show that these judges define their juvenile
court role largely in terms of the juvenile court philosophy. All of them
indicated some degree of the "Criminal Court" approach, but only three
of 56 questionnaire respondents gave a majority of "Criminal Court"
responses. The major hypothesis must then be rejected.
What explanation is there for this finding? The only factor found to
be associated with the "Juvenile Court" approach at a reasonably high
level of significance is the size of the judge's current town of residence,
and this association is small. But, even if this association indicates a
causal relationship, it would seem to offer little help because Iowa is a
relatively rural state. Perhaps the answer lies in the effect on the judges'
attitudes of the few juvenile court cases which have been appealed to
the Iowa Supreme Court. In these few cases the rehabilitative aim is
very definitely embraced, and the notion that juvenile offenders must
have the right of due process, which is guaranteed accused criminals, is
explicitly rejected. This seems to be laden with procedural implications
for anyone who thinks logically. Since Iowa's judges feel their juvenile
court duties very keenly it seems a reasonable assumption that most or
all of them have read these cases carefully, and have tried to follow
them. It seems probable that this factor was underestimated in the
study, and that it has been underestimated by students of the juvenile
court generally.
Considerable evidence of the primary group approach to the juvenile
court role appeared both in questionnaire and interview statements.
This was found not to be a middle ground somewhere between the
"Criminal Court" and "Juvenile Court" approaches; but rather to
be associated with the marked criminal court approach. A possible
interpretation is that punitive-minded judges cannot commit a very
large percent of offenders to correctional institutions because of space
limitations, and they resort to primary group methods of punishment.
Finally, attention is called to the more important limitations of
this study: (1) it has dealt mainly with verbally expressed attitudes,
and a more comprehensive study of the juvenile court judge's role-
definition would necessarily include more thoroughgoing attempts to
learn the determinants of particular attitudes, as well as study of the
behavior of the judge in court. It is here assumed, however, that verbal
behavior is as much a part of the "real" role-definition as any other
kind of behavior, and that it is probably the most parsimonious ap-
proach. (2) No attempt was made to measure the intensity of attitudes
or to assign different weights to items investigated. (3) This study
dealt with judges in a limited geographic area-the State of Iowa.
1951]
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Anyone who believes this is too obvious and simple a limitation even
to be mentioned is invited to consider Paul W. Tappan's recommended
juvenile court reforms which are based on a study of one very special
type of court in New York City.38 The investigator believes that Iowa's
juvenile courts are more typical of juvenile courts throughout the United
States than is the Wayward Minor Court of New York,"9 but it is
possible that Iowa's judges are influenced by factors inoperative in other
states which condition their definitions of the role of juvenile court
judge.
38. PAUL W. TAPPAN, Delinquent Girls in Court: At Study of the Wayward Minor
Court of New York, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947. Tappan recom-
mends that the offender in the juvenile court should have the full constitutional safeguards
of the criminal law (p. 196), that statutes should specify a precise course of conduct (pp.
98-106), and that probation officers' reports should be made only after the child is adjudi-
cated delinquent (pp. 108-10). The Wayward Minor Court Statute provides that the
offender must be adjudged delinquent by competent evidence (p. 234), and Tappan does
not compare this with juvenile court statutes in general. He notes a high proportion of
commitments in the Wayward Minor Court (pp. 89-91) and stresses this in his recom-
mendations, but fails to consider the possibility that the proportion of commitments in
juvenile courts as a whole might be much lower.
39. FREDERICK W. KILLIAN, "The Juvenile Court as an Institution" Annals 261:100,
January, 1949.
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